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Abstract. We might be tempted to think that, necessarily, if God unsurpassably loves such 
created persons as there may be, then for any capable created person S and time t, God is at t 
open to being in a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with S at t, where 
one is open to relationship with another only if one never does anything (by commission or 
omission) that would have the result that the other was prevented from being able, just by trying, 
to participate in that relationship. I argue that we should resist the temptation. 
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We can view divine hiddenness in at least two very different ways. On the one hand, we can 
view it as evidence against the existence of God and, on the other hand, we can view it as partly 
constitutive of our relationship with God, insofar as we assume that we are in a relationship with 
God. There are connections between viewing divine hiddenness in these two ways, connections 
we might systematically map. My aim here is much more modest. I aim to assess a version of the 
argument from divine hiddenness for atheism, as it is sometimes called. I hope, however, that 
what I have to say might provide some idea as to how at least some of us might understand and 
be at peace with the hiddenness of God, insofar as we assume that we are in a relationship with 
God. Before I turn to my task, some preliminary remarks are in order. 
 First, “divine hiddenness” misnames that to which the argument by that name appeals. It 
sounds as though it moves from the premise that there is a God who is hidden to the conclusion 
that there is no God. Nobody argues like that. Rather, the idea is that if there is a God, there are 
no reasonable non-believers, or inculpable non-believers, or non-resistant non-believers (all of 
these terms have been used); but there are, and so there’s no God. 
 Second, perfect-being theologians agree that God, whatever the details, is an 
unsurpassably good personal being. I am a perfect-being theologian. However, unlike many of 
my kind, I posit unsurpassable love as the most central feature of an unsurpassably good personal 
being, a feature that constrains all other features that an unsurpassably good personal being must 
have. Thus, for example, if God unsurpassably loves such created persons as there may be only if 
God is unable to do certain things, and if God is omnipotent only if God is able to do those 
things, I infer that God is not omnipotent. Does it follow that, on my view, God is a bit of a 
wimp? No, it only follows that omnipotence is not the best way to understand the power of God. 
Perhaps almightiness is a better way, where at a first approximation, what it is for a person to be 
unsurpassably almighty is for her to be the source of every power of every possible being other 
than herself. Fortunately, nothing in what follows hangs on my idiosyncratic theology. I mention 
it only to stress from the outset that, as will soon be evident, the argument I will discuss targets 
the heart of my view. 
Third, I bring three assumptions to my task. (i) The argument from divine hiddenness is 
independent of other arguments for atheism, notably the argument from evil and the argument 
from suboptimality. If an adequate defense of the argument from divine hiddenness must appeal 
to the conclusion that God would not allow bad things of a certain sort, or if it must appeal to the 
conclusion God would never do less than the best God could do, then the success of the 
argument from divine hiddenness depends on the success of the arguments for these other 
conclusions, arguments that are failures, to my mind. I’m interested in an argument from divine 
hiddenness that isn’t, by my lights, a failure from the outset. (ii) If there is a God, then each 
created person will live forever. This implies that, for human creatures, and perhaps others too, 
their “earthly life,” as we sometimes call it, is just an infinitesimal portion of their existence. (iii) 
Each created person will at some time enter into, and from that time onwards maintain, a 
positively meaningful, reciprocal conscious relationship with God that will be evident to all 
concerned. 
 With these remarks in mind, let’s turn to the argument from divine hiddenness. 
 I will focus on a version of the argument recently put forward by J. L. Schellenberg, one 
that features non-resistant non-belief and a certain sort of openness to a certain sort of 
relationship. He puts it like this: 
 The Argument from Nonresistant Nonbelief  
(1) Necessarily, if God exists, then God unsurpassably loves such created persons as 
there may be. 
(2) Necessarily, if God unsurpassably loves such created persons as there may be, then 
for any capable created person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a positively 
meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with S at t. 
(3) Necessarily, if for any capable created person S and time t, God is at t open to being 
in a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with S at t, then for 
any capable created person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t in a state of 
non-resistant non-belief viz-a-viz the proposition that God exists. 
(4)  There is at least one capable created person S and time t such that S is or was at t in a 
state of non-resistant non-belief viz-a-viz the proposition that God exists. 
(5)  Therefore, God does not exist.1 
                                                 
1 Schellenberg 2015, xxx-xxx. I have deviated in one respect from Schellenberg’s statement of his argument. Where 
I have used “created persons” Schellenberg uses “finite persons”. Since I don’t understand “finite” as a predicate 
What should we make of this argument? 
The conclusion formally follows from the premises and, as I have already said, I think 
premise (1) is true. I will also grant premise (4). Before we can assess whether the remaining 
premises are true, we must understand them. Since I mean to engage Schellenberg, I will tend to 
what he has to say about its central concepts and I will do so as I summarize his reasons for 
believing premises 2 and 3. 
 So then: suppose God unsurpassably loves a created person, call her Anna. How might 
we characterize that love? At a minimum, it must involve benevolence, says Schellenberg, caring 
for Anna’s well-being. But it involves much more. God unsurpassably loves Anna, says 
Schellenberg, only if God aims “at relationship—a conscious and reciprocal relationship that is 
positively meaningful, allowing for a deep sharing” between them. Moreover, if God 
unsurpassably loves Anna, God will value that relationship for its own sake, and not merely for 
the sake of something else. Furthermore, if God unsurpassably loves Anna, then God must 
always love her, and so God must always value, seek, desire, promote, or preserve personal 
relationship with her, although God will not force himself on her. At the very least, all this 
requires that God will always be open to personal relationship with her.2 
 This notion of openness to personal relationship with those who are capable of it—that 
is, with those who possess “the cognitive and affective properties required to [participate in such 
relationship],” which, in the case of God, “would involve such things as a capacity to feel the 
                                                 
applied to persons, I don’t understand any premise that uses “finite persons,” which means I don’t understand any of 
Schellenberg’s actual premises. But I do understand “created” as a predicate applied to persons; at least I understand 
it much better than “finite”. So I have substituted the former for the latter. Also, where he uses “personal 
relationship,” I substitute his more informative “positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship”. 
2 Schellenberg 2015, xxxxx. 
presence of God, recognizing it as such; a capacity to exhibit attitudes of trust, gratitude, and 
obedience to God, and so on”—is crucial. Here’s what Schellenberg says about it: 
If one is always open in the sense I intend then, even if one does not actively seek or 
promote personal relationship with another person capable of participating in such 
relationship…, one makes sure that there is nothing one ever does (in a broad sense 
including omissions) that would have the result of making such relationship unavailable 
to the other, preventing her from being able to relate personally to one, even should she 
then try. So for God to always be open to personal relationship with a capable created 
person such as Anna in a manner expressing unsurpassable love is for God to ensure that 
there is never something God does that prevents her from being able, just by trying, to 
participate in personal relationship with God…. She may not want relationship or even to 
be reminded of her religious options, and so may through resistance of God, which would 
have to involve self-deception, herself produce a situation in which she is unable to relate 
personally to God just by trying. But unless she is resistant in this way at a time, she will 
find it possible to participate in personal relationship with God, and to do so then. Never 
will she find the door to such relationship closed. This, at the very minimum, is required 
if God unsurpassably loves Anna in a manner aimed at personal relationship with her.3 
As for premise 3, Schellenberg says that Anna could not be in a positively meaningful 
and reciprocal conscious relationship with God unless she believed that God exists. He writes: 
a personal relationship is a conscious, reciprocal relationship, and a conscious 
relationship is a relationship one recognizes oneself to be in. Given these facts, one 
clearly cannot even get started in a personal relationship without believing that the other 
                                                 
3 Schellenberg 2015, xxxxx. For the sake of continuity with my discussion, I’ve replaced variables in Schellenberg’s 
text with the names of Anna and God. 
party exists. Now belief, as most contemporary philosophers would agree, is involuntary 
in the sense that one cannot choose to believe something at a time just by trying to. So by 
God’s not revealing God’s existence, God is doing something that makes it impossible 
for Anna to participate in personal relationship with God at the relevant time just by 
trying, and this, according to our definition of openness, is precisely what is involved in 
God’s not being open to having such a relationship with Anna then. 
Upshot: if God is open to being in a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship 
with Anna, then, if she is capable of such a relationship and she does not render herself unable to 
participate in it, God will reveal himself in such a way that Anna believes that God exists. 
I have four things to say about this argument. 
First, although we might question Schellenberg’s understanding of what it is to be open 
to relationship, I will grant his meaning. Specifically, I will grant that one is open to relationship 
with another only if one never does anything (by commission or omission) that would have the 
result that the other was prevented from being able, just by trying, to participate in that 
relationship. 
In that case, and this is the second thing I want to say, it is not clear to me that 
unsurpassable love requires openness, so understood; and so it is not clear to me that premise (2) 
is true. Let me explain. 
I begin with a more general question. Why couldn’t preventing one whom we love from 
being able, just by trying, to participate in relationship with us sometimes be the loving thing for 
us to do? Why couldn’t making ourselves unavailable be what love requires, or at least allows? If 
that’s possible, then, presumably, we would have to have some good reason to make ourselves 
unavailable. Gratuitous unavailability is not consonant with love aimed at personal relationship. 
Can we make sense of this suggestion? 
Maybe.4 Let’s approach it by first thinking about it in the context of a positively 
meaningful, reciprocal, conscious relationship that is already evident to all. Sometimes our 
attachments to others in such relationships can be hurtful to ourselves, as when we depend on 
them, intentionally or not, to sustain bad habits we’ve acquired. In such a case, the loving thing 
for them to do might be to make themselves unavailable to us, and perhaps even to shun our 
efforts to participate in the relationship. In this connection, think of the advice sometimes given 
to those who unwittingly enable self-destructive behavioural tendencies on the part of the addicts 
who are their spouses, children, or friends, by preventing those whom they love from 
experiencing the natural consequences of their addiction. Moreover, sometimes our attachments 
to others in such relationships have their source in motivations that, in effect at least, involve 
viewing them as instruments to our own ends, whether consciously or unconsciously. Once 
again, in such a case, the loving thing for them to do might be to make themselves unavailable to 
us, and perhaps even to shun our efforts to participate in the relationship. In this connection, 
think of the advice that you might well give to a woman who discovers that her partner was 
motivated, whether consciously or unconsciously, to enter into their relationship, and now stays 
in it, largely for the sake of the gratification of his own domestic and other needs, especially 
when he refuses to own these sources of his attachment to her when he is repeatedly confronted 
with the truth. 
Of course, even if we can make sense of making ourselves unavailable in the context of 
such relationships, it does not follow that we can make sense of making ourselves unavailable 
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before any such relationship begins, at least not when our love aims at such a personal 
relationship and the person whom we love is capable of such a relationship and is in no way 
resisting it. Our question, then, is whether such unavailability in such circumstances can make 
sense before any such relationship even begins. 
Notice that when we make ourselves unavailable within the context of personal 
relationship, and when our doing so is no strike against our love or even flows from our love, we 
typically aim to reform the one we love, or at least make it more likely that he will be reformed, 
and we aim to do so not only for his sake but for our sake, and for the sake of the relationship 
itself, that it might be better than it otherwise would be. Might something like this guide us, in a 
loving way, before we even initiate personal relationship with those whom we love? More to the 
point, might something like this guide God, in a loving way, before God initiates personal 
relationship with such created persons as there may be? 
To begin to look into this question, notice that some created persons, at the dawn of their 
capacity to relate personally to God, might already be ill-disposed toward such a relationship.5 
Through no fault of their own, they might have become ill-disposed toward anything having to 
do with God. Perhaps they were raised to be hostile or indifferent toward religion, whether by 
family members or the social groups in which they grew up. Religion is for the servile and 
spineless, the stupid and the unscientific, they were taught, day in and day out. God is a crutch, 
worse yet, a stretcher, for the weak and cowardly. And the teaching stuck; they are now ill-
disposed. Or perhaps they had instilled in them an extreme self-centeredness or disrespect for 
proper authority. Or perhaps they were raised in abusively strict religious surroundings. Or 
perhaps there was some other cause. But, whatever the cause might be, they now find 
                                                 
5 I emphasize that here and below I am not describing non-believers “in the midst of life” (Schellenberg 2015a, 205-
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themselves, through no fault of their own, ill-disposed non-believers. That is to say, if God were 
to reveal himself to them in such a way that they came to believe that God exists, they would or 
would very likely respond inappropriately; they would or would very likely either reject God’s 
self-revelation or believe with anything from indifference to hostility. 
How might an unsurpassably loving God respond to people like this, as their capacity to 
relate personally with him emerges? Well, first off, God might think that there is no point in 
revealing himself to them. For, even if such a revelation does result in their believing God exists, 
God doesn’t care about mere belief; he cares about an appropriate response. But such a response 
would be at least very unlikely. Secondly, if God were to reveal himself in such a way that they 
came to believe, he would at the very least stand a good chance of contributing to their ill-
disposition being confirmed in them by their actually rejecting his self-disclosure or their 
actually believing with indifference or hostility. That would be counter-productive to his 
purposes since he wants their ill-disposition toward him to be weakened, not strengthened. So 
God waits for a time, waits to reveal himself in such a way that they believe that he exists, giving 
them the opportunity to become more receptive to him and more apt to respond appropriately to 
his self-disclosure, and he influences them in subtle but respectful and loving ways toward this 
end, e.g. by placing religiously serious people in their lives who are neither stupid nor 
unscientific, neither servile nor spineless, and so on. 
One might object. After all, we must remember the variety of ways in which God could 
reveal himself to ill-disposed non-believers; and “if we consider that this could occur…through a 
direct encounter with an omnipotent love capable of softening even the most self-centered or 
embittered soul, then it seems that this class of individuals must be empty”.6 By way of reply, 
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three points need mentioning. First, this class of individuals could be empty in the envisioned 
circumstances only if the direct encounter with God at the dawn of their capacity to relate 
personally with him wipes out the dispositions toward him that are definitive of their being ill-
disposed. That God would not do. For the actions, attitudes, and affections that would result from 
such a miraculous disposition-adjustment would arise from something over which ill-disposed 
non-believers had no say, in which case those actions, etc. would be a farce, a sham, and God 
would know it. Second, unsurpassable love does not force itself on created persons in the way 
envisioned; at least not when they have yet to be given an opportunity to contribute to the desired 
changes and to own them. Third, for non-believers to be ill-disposed toward God just is for them 
not to be capable of being “softened” by a direct experience of his love, or at the very least for 
them to be very unlikely to be “softened” by it, in which case we cannot infer that “this class of 
individuals must be empty”. 
One might object again. For, on the suggestion put forward here, God aims in various 
ways to facilitate a better disposition in ill-disposed non-believers through subtle, respectful, and 
loving ways that are compatible with nonbelief. But “it is hard to see how God's task here would 
not be more effectively prosecuted by means of the many influences presupposing belief,” 
especially in light of the fact that they are resistant through no fault of their own.7 By way of 
reply, that all depends on what God’s task is. If God’s task is (i) to facilitate a better disposition 
in ill-disposed non-believers, one that they are in no small part responsible for, and (ii) to do so 
without running the risk that their ill-dispositions will become more deeply entrenched in them 
by their responding inappropriately to God’s revealing himself to them in such a way that they 
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believe that he exists, then it is false that God’s task would be more effectively prosecuted by 
means that presuppose belief. 
Of course, even if we can make sense of what has just been said about ill-disposed 
nonbelievers, it is irrelevant to the argument at hand. That’s because the argument at hand 
appeals to non-resistant non-believers, and no ill-disposed non-believer is a non-resistant non-
believer. Still, seeing what might be said about ill-disposed non-believers prepares us for what 
might be said about well-disposed non-believers, or as Schellenberg calls them, non-resistant 
nonbelievers. So let’s consider non-resistant non-believers, non-believers who are well-disposed 
toward God as their capacity to relate to him personally emerges, those who would welcome 
entering into a personal relationship with God of the sort Schellenberg describes if God were to 
reveal himself at that time in such a way that they came to believe that he exists. And let’s 
distinguish two cases: (i) well-disposed non-believers who are not responsible for being well-
disposed and (ii) well-disposed non-believers who are responsible for being well-disposed.  
As for the first sort of case—those who are not responsible for being well-disposed—
examples might include created persons who have been virtually determined, say, by parental or 
other social training, to be well-disposed but who for one reason or another do not yet believe 
that God exists. In that case, as they become capable of relating personally to God, they are 
disposed to enter into such a relationship with him, alright; but they had no say in becoming so 
well-disposed. This is unfortunate because, all else being equal, a state of affairs in which one 
enters into a personal relationship with God but one had little if any say in being disposed to do 
so in the first place is not nearly as good as a state of affairs in which one enters into such a 
relationship with God and one had a significant say about becoming disposed to do so. Suppose 
God prefers the better state of affairs. In that case, God might well not reveal himself in such a 
way that well-disposed nonbelievers who are not responsible for being so well-disposed believe 
that God exists. For, again, they are not responsible for being disposed to enter into such a 
relationship, and God prefers them to confirm their good disposition toward him, on their own, in 
the face of contrary desires and competing allegiances, before he reveals himself to them in such 
a way that they come to believe that he exists. In that way, God allows them to make their 
involuntarily acquired good dispositions toward him and relating to him personally genuinely 
their own. 
Now consider the second sort of case—those well-disposed nonbelievers who were 
responsible for becoming so disposed. They constitute the most difficult case for the suggestion 
I’m exploring. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we can say something plausible about them. 
But let me first register a worry, a significant worry, to my mind. There are no such 
created persons. Character formation is not under the voluntary control of a child. Thus, by the 
time a non-believer becomes capable of a relationship with God, she won’t be responsible for 
being well-disposed toward God, assuming she is well-disposed. If that’s right, then what I’ve 
said about the first sort of case will suffice since there will be no members in the second sort of 
case.  
I’ve put this worry rather starkly. Why should I suppose that there are no such created 
persons, no created persons who, at the dawn of their capacity to relate personally with God, are 
both well-disposed toward God and responsible for being so well-disposed?  
That’s a good question. A more measured claim is that it’s pretty likely that there are no 
such persons. We know enough about the sources of character formation in children to say that’s 
it’s not likely that, on the assumption that a child is well-disposed toward God at the dawn of her 
capacity to relate personally to God, she is responsible for being so well-disposed. Still, the point 
of the question stands. Why couldn’t there be exceptions? And my answer is that there can be—
for all I can tell. So I should not categorically state that there are no such created persons. 
Nevertheless, it strikes me as pretty unlikely. 
Those who think that there are some created persons who, at the dawn of their capacity to 
relate personally with God, are well-disposed toward God and were responsible for becoming so 
well-disposed need to tell us why they think this. Do they know of a particular person who 
satisfied this description? Who is it? And why do they think that this person, at the time in 
question, is or was well-disposed and responsible for being well-disposed? What’s their 
evidence? To the extent that we are really in the dark about whether there are such persons, we 
should be reticent to affirm that there are non-resistant non-believers of this sort.  
Still, what if there are? What might be said about created persons who, at the dawn of 
their capacity to relate personally to God, are well-disposed non-believers and responsible for 
being well-disposed? Well, as is well-known, one’s motivations for entering into a personal 
relationship can be significantly less than they otherwise might be, and one might not even be 
aware of it. For example, sometimes what motivates one to enter into a personal relationship is a 
desire to extend one’s power or influence, to increase one’s pleasure, or to satisfy one’s curiosity. 
Other times its source is insecurity or fear, e.g. fear of being alone or unprotected. Or a desire to 
please one’s peers, parents, or social group. And there are other lesser sources of motivation as 
well.  
Likewise in the sort of case we are currently considering. Well-disposed non-believers 
may well be disposed to welcome a personal relationship with God upon on coming to believe 
that he exists, but they might be so disposed for reasons that are not as fitting as they might be. 
For example, it is arguably most fitting to want to relate to God personally mainly for God’s 
moral beauty, his holiness. Relatedly, perhaps no disposition to enter into a personal relationship 
with God is properly motivated unless its source is a strong desire to surrender to God’s will, to 
unite one’s own will with God’s will. In that case, the possibility arises that if God were to reveal 
himself in such a way that such people believed that he exists, they would welcome entering into 
a personal relationship with him, alright; but their initial welcome would not be properly 
motivated.  
This is unfortunate. For, all else being equal, a state of affairs in which one enters into a 
personal relationship with God as a result of a good disposition grounded in unfitting motivations 
is not nearly as good as a state of affairs in which one enters into such a relationship with God as 
a result of a good disposition grounded in fitting motivations. Suppose God prefers the better 
state of affairs. In that case, God might well not reveal himself in such a way that well-disposed 
non-resistant nonbelievers who are responsible for being so well-disposed believe that God 
exists. For, again, although they are responsible for being disposed to enter into a personal 
relationship with God, God prefers that, right from the start of their relationship, the sources of 
their good dispositions toward being in a relationship with him are better than they in fact are. 
And why shouldn’t God want this for people such as this, people he loves? After all, what’s the 
hurry: There’s an eternity of love ahead of them. So why shouldn’t God want those whom he 
loves to have a shot at the better state of affairs? Consequently, before God reveals himself to 
them in such a way that they come to believe that he exists, he allows them to change the source 
of their good dispositions toward him and to confirm that change over time before he reveals 
himself to them in such a way that they come to believe that he exists. Indeed, it may well be 
imperfectly loving of God to not to want this for them. 
One might object. After all, can’t God’s reasons as I have described them for not 
revealing himself be “accommodated” in the context of a positively meaningful, reciprocal, 
conscious relationship that is accompanied by self-revelation that produces belief? Well, in a 
word, no; for what God prefers as I have just described it can only be realized before any such 
relationship gets started. In the case of well-disposed non-believers who were not responsible for 
being well-disposed, God prefers this state of affairs:  
• that they make their good disposition toward entering into a relationship with God their 
own, and confirm it as such, before God reveals himself to them in such a way that they 
come to belief and begin a personal relationship with him.  
And, in the case of well-disposed non-believers who were responsible for being well-disposed, 
God prefers this state of affairs:  
• that they modify, or at least aim to modify, the unfitting sources of their good disposition 
toward entering into a relationship with God, and confirm this modification or aim, 
before God reveals himself to them in such a way that they come to belief and begin a 
personal relationship with him. 
It’s absolutely impossible for either of these states of affairs to obtain after the persons in 
question come to belief. So the “accommodationist strategy,” as Schellenberg calls it, won’t 
work with respect to the suggestion I’m exploring.8 Of course, God’s preferences might go 
unsatisfied, in which case he’ll have to adopt another strategy if he aims to bring about 
relationship with such people. But the suggestion on offer is that it is no strike against God’s love 
if God holds out—for a time, not for an eternity—for the preferable state of affairs. 
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One might object again. Have I really described a preferable state of affairs? After all, 
consider the alternatives. In the case of well-disposed non-believers who were not responsible for 
being well-disposed, the alternative is this: 
• that God reveals himself to them in such a way that they believe, they begin a personal 
relationship with him, and then they make their good disposition toward God their own 
and confirm it.  
And, in the case of well-disposed non-believers who were responsible for being well-disposed, 
the alternative is this:  
• that God reveals himself to them in such a way that they believe, they begin a personal 
relationship with him, and then they modify the unfitting sources of their good 
disposition toward God and confirm this modification. 
Surely, the objection goes, this latter pair of state of affairs is better than the former, and so God 
would prefer them.9 
 I’m not so sure about that. Consider an analogy. Suppose that over several months Nancy 
describes her friend Joe to Mary, in glittering detail. He is intelligent, kind-hearted, witty, 
athletic, responsible, and just plain fun to hang out with; moreover, as the photos reveal, he’s 
handsome as heck. To make a long story short, Mary finds herself attracted to Joe. She wants to 
meet him. Then she learns that Nancy has been talking her up to Joe as well, and he’s attracted to 
her and wants to meet her too. Excellent! She has those first pangs of love for Joe, to get to know 
him, and him her. And the same goes for Joe. Now suppose that Mary (somehow!) learns that 
some trait of character that makes for a long-term relationship has never been tested in Joe, e.g. 
faithfulness through difficulty. Or suppose that she (somehow!) learns that Joe’s budding love of 
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her is in no small part motivated by an unconscious desire to benefit from her connections to 
people that can advance his interests. 
Would we count it against Mary’s budding love if she were to pause, mull it over, give it 
some time, before she connected with Joe? I would not. After all, his capacity for faithfulness is 
untested; the source of his budding love isn’t what it should be, or at least it could be 
significantly better. Would we count it a strike against her love if she prefers a state of affairs in 
which Joe’s faithfulness in relationships is tested before she connected with him, if she prefers a 
state of affairs in which there is a more admirable source of his attraction to her before she 
connected with him? Again, I would not.  
What would be the point of Mary’s waiting? Well, it would be better for both of them if, 
right from the start, his good disposition toward her was fashioned by a faithfulness that had 
some mettle to it, and it would be better for both of them if, right from the start, his budding love 
of her had a more admirable source; moreover, it would be a better relationship as well, right at 
the start. Furthermore, in the waiting she might discover something else about Joe: that he’s the 
sort of guy who does have some mettle, or at least a tendency in that direction, and that he’s the 
sort of guy who is willing to let others close enough to help him to become a better person. 
On the suggestion that I’m exploring, that’s what it’s like with God and the well-disposed 
nonbeliever. He’s giving it a couple of days or weeks, so to speak, to see whether they can get 
the relationship off to a better start. That’s a preferable state of affairs, by my lights. 
Perhaps there are other goods we know of for the sake of which God, by virtue of being 
unsurpassably loving, might be temporarily unavailable to people at the dawn of their capacity to 
relate personally to God. And, of course—and this is the third point I want to make—there is 
always the possibility that there are goods we do not know of for the sake of which God might 
temporarily refrain from making himself available to such people. Regarding this suggestion, 
Schellenberg writes: 
Opponents of the hiddenness argument sometimes also develop the objection that there 
might very well be goods unknown to us that require hiddenness, for the sake of which 
God would permit it, but if one has been led to accept the hiddenness argument’s 
premises, then this move fails. That’s because from what some of those premises allow us 
to conclude, namely, that a loving God would not permit nonresistant nonbelief, it 
deductively follows that there are no goods, known or unknown, such that for their sake 
God might do so. So that becomes acceptable too—after all, it evidently follows from 
what one views thus – and the present objection is shown to beg the question.10 
I find these words perplexing. For, although it is true that, if a loving God would not permit non-
resistant non-belief, then there are no goods such that for their sake a loving God would permit 
non-resistant non-belief, any open-minded inquirer with a modicum of intellectual humility will 
refuse to accept that a loving God would not permit non-resistant non-belief until she had first 
satisfied her natural curiosity about whether there are any goods, known or unknown, such that 
for their sake a loving God would permit non-resistant non-belief. To satisfy such curiosity 
requires two things. First, it requires that she consider known goods such as, in my opinion, those 
I have mentioned, and others mentioned in the literature as well. Second, it requires that she 
consider whether she is in a position to tell whether there are any goods unknown to her that 
might figure in a loving God’s purposes in permitting non-resistant non-belief. This second 
requirement is crucial. For suppose that she were to discover that, even if there is no good basis 
for thinking there is a God, and even if she does not know of any good that might figure in a 
                                                 
10 Schellenberg 2015, xxxxx. 
loving God’s purposes in permitting non-resistant non-belief, she should be in doubt about 
whether she is in a position to tell whether there are any unknown goods of the sort in question. 
In that case, I would think, we would expect her open-mindedness and intellectual humility to 
lead her to refrain from accepting that a loving God would not permit non-resistant non-belief.  
 In refraining from accepting that a loving God would not permit non-resistant non-belief, 
she would refrain from accepting Schellenberg’s premise (2). Would she thereby deserve to be 
derided as an “opponent of the hiddenness argument”? Would she thereby deserve the charge of 
“begging the question”? I don’t see why. Perhaps she is simply attentive to, and owns, her 
intellectual limitations; and perhaps she does so out of a love for truth, knowledge, and 
understanding. In that case, any such derision and accusation would be wholly out of place.11 
 A fourth, and final, point has to do with premise (3). As Schellenberg makes clear, the 
thought that is driving this premise is that one cannot even “get started” in a personal 
relationship—a conscious, reciprocal, positively meaningful relationship—without believing that 
the other party exists. And that’s because, as Schellenberg puts it, one can “get started” in such a 
relationship only if one is consciously aware of the other party, and one is consciously aware of 
the other party only if one “recognizes” oneself to be in such a relationship, and one recognizes 
oneself to be in such a relationship only if one believes that the other party exists.  
Let’s look into this line of thought briefly. 
 First, we need to distinguish de re awareness from de dicto awareness. You can be aware 
of something without being aware that it, under a certain description, is what you are aware of. 
You can be aware of Jimmy Carter without being aware that Jimmy Carter is the person you are 
looking at. And Anna can be aware of God without being aware that God is the one whom she is 
                                                 
11 For more on intellectual humility conceived as being properly attentive to, and owning, one’s intellectual 
limitations, see Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, and Howard-Snyder unpublished. 
aware of. Second, one can be in a reciprocal, positively meaningful relationship with another 
person without believing that the other person exists, as when, unbeknownst to you, a benefactor 
has been looking after your interests in various ways. So a lot seems to be riding on the 
qualification that an unsurpassably loving person would seek a relationship with the beloved in 
which he was consciously aware of her. But is it de re or de dicto conscious awareness that is 
required, or both? 
 I’m not really sure. But if only de re conscious awareness is required, then it seems much 
more plausible that we can at least “get started” in a conscious, reciprocal, personal relationship 
with God even if we lack belief that God exists, perhaps even if we believe that God does not 
exist. Would that be ideal? Well, no. But hopefully we’ve gotten past identifying the real with 
the ideal. That is, presumably we can have a real conscious, reciprocal, personal relationship 
with God that is not ideal, and perhaps that relationship can commence with de re conscious 
awareness of God instead of de dicto conscious awareness.12 
 
References 
Howard-Snyder, D. 1996. “The Argument from Divine Hiddenness,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 26: 433-453. 
Schellenberg, J.L. 1996. “Response to Howard-Snyder,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 
455-462. 
Schellenberg, J.L. 2005a. “The hiddenness argument revisited (I),” Religious Studies 41: 201-
215. 
                                                 
12 Thanks to Adam Green and Eleonore Stump for their insightful comments and objections, none of which I have 
addressed properly. This paper was made possible through the support of a grant from Templeton Religion 
Trust. The opinions expressed in it are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton 
Religion Trust. 
Schellenberg, J.L. 2005b. “The hiddenness argument revisited (II),” Religious Studies 41: 287-
303. 
Schellenberg, J.L. 2015. “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy,” in eds. Adam Green and 
Eleonore Stump, Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives. New York, 
Cambridge: xxx-xxx. 
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., and Howard-Snyder, D. Unpublished. “Intellectual 
Humility: Owning our Limitations”. 
